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Abstract

Societies in which fertility is falling and human capital investment
per child is increasing are experiencing a “quantity-quality” transition. Such
transitions imply, over the long term, both slower rates of labor force growth
and higher levels of human capital per worker. They are fundamental to
economic development. Yet, these transitions are neither automatic nor selfpropelling. Their momentum depends on competing forces acting at both
the family and the macroeconomic levels; the balance can easily tip against
further transition.
Family decisions about schooling are largely motivated by its private
economic returns. These returns are determined in labor markets, and here
the logic of supply and demand applies. When families decide to invest
more deeply in their children, they collectively produce right-ward shifts
in the supply of educated young labor. If other things are held fixed, the
rate of return to schooling should then fall, and this, in turn, should dampen
parental enthusiasm for further educational investments. Reductions in the
rate of return should also weaken the case for continued reductions in fertility. Unless they are counterbalanced by other forces, such negative feedbacks would tend to bring a quantity-quality transition to a halt.
The aim of this paper is to explore both the negative and positive
feedbacks that have affected the quantity-quality transition in Asia. We assemble the leading hypotheses and evidence on the macroeconomic forces,
both domestic and international, that could influence returns to schooling.
We also examine family factors, giving particular attention to the intergenerational links that seem to have maintained the momentum of the Asian
transition. Our conclusion is that negative feedbacks associated with increases in the relative supplies of educated labor have been largely offset
by beneficial macroeconomic change (resulting from increases in the stock
of physical capital, substantial technological change, and trade) and by powerful family-level effects that, over the generations, have continued to propel the transition.
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One can hardly imagine macroeconomic development being sustained without support from a quantity-quality transition, during which families decrease
their fertility and increase their human capital investments in children. The reductions in fertility are expressed, after a lag, in slower rates of labor force growth.
Greater schooling investments per child translate into higher levels of human
capital per worker. In this way, the substitution of quality for quantity in family
strategies helps to guide the macroeconomy toward higher income per worker.
Yet, quantity-quality transitions cannot be regarded as automatic or selfpropelling mechanisms. Their operation depends on competing forces acting at
both the family and the macroeconomic levels, and the balance can easily tip
against further transition. Consider family decisions about schooling, which are
largely motivated by its private economic returns.1 These returns are determined
in labor markets, and here the logic of supply and demand applies. When families decide to invest more deeply in their children, they collectively produce rightward shifts in the supply of educated young labor. If other things are held constant, the rate of return to schooling should then fall, and this, in turn, should
dampen parental enthusiasm for further educational investments. Reductions in
the rate of return should also weaken the case for continued reductions in fertility. Unless they are counterbalanced by other forces, such negative feedbacks
would tend to bring a quantity-quality transition to a halt.
In the well-documented case of Korea (Kim and Topel 1995), economic
returns to tertiary schooling fell considerably during the 1980s, evidently in response to such supply shifts. Similar changes have been detected in the late 1980s
for Taiwan (Huang 1998). What is the record elsewhere? Are high returns generally maintained in spite of shifts in the supply of skills? If so, is this due to the
spillover benefits of trade, technological change that sustains the demand for
skilled labor, or capital accumulation that complements skills? Perhaps government investments in the quality of education also play a role, in that such investments are made more easily where the growth rate of the school-age population
is lower (Mason 1993; Mason and Campbell 1993).

The aim of this paper is to explore both the negative and positive feedbacks that have affected the quantity-quality transition in Asia. We assemble the
leading hypotheses and evidence on the macroeconomic forces, both domestic
and international, that could influence returns to schooling. We also examine
family factors, giving particular attention to the intergenerational links that seem
to have maintained the momentum of the Asian transition.
The paper is organized as follows. The first section outlines the
microeconomic perspective on fertility and schooling that motivates the study.
We then briefly review the record of fertility decline and rising school enrollments in the countries of East and Southeast Asia and in a set of comparison
countries in South and South-Central Asia. Following this review, we present
evidence on the key variables that link the macroeconomic forces to family-level
decisions: rates of return to primary, secondary, and tertiary schooling. Rate-ofreturn calculations from Psacharopoulos (1985, 1994) are examined, together
with supplementary evidence drawn from other sources. We discuss the macroeconomic factors that are thought to influence these rates of return and test several of the leading hypotheses with country-level data.
We then turn to the family-level evidence, presenting estimates of fertility
and children’s schooling from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Thailand, and Taiwan. The issue of interest in this section is whether,
even with the aggregate returns to schooling held constant, powerful family-level
forces might continue to promote a quantity-quality transition. We find strong
evidence of such positive feedbacks. The final section presents a discussion of
our results and the conclusions.
A M ICROECONOMIC P ERSPECTIVE
Figure 1 displays the quantity-quality transitions in the regions of Asia on
which we focus. The experiences of countries in East and Southeast Asia are
shown in Figure 1a; those of selected South and South-Central Asian countries
4

Figure 1a The Quantity-Quality Transition, 1970–85
East and Southeast Asian Countries
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are depicted in Figure 1b. In each of these figures, the total fertility rate is on the
horizontal axis, and one measure of human capital investment—secondary school
enrollment ratios—is displayed on the vertical. Each country is represented by
two points, corresponding to 1970 and 1985, with an arrow indicating the direction of change. As can be seen, profound changes in fertility and schooling were
underway in East and Southeast Asia over the 15-year period considered in the
figure. The case of Korea is perhaps most remarkable, combining deep reductions in fertility with impressive increases in secondary school enrollments. Other
countries have also made notable strides, as in the cases of Thailand and China with
respect to fertility, and Hong Kong and Singapore with respect to enrollments.
Turning to the other Asian countries in Figure 1b, we see changes of the
same nature but of lesser extent.2 Pakistan registered a modest decline in fertility,
5

Figure 1b The Quantity-Quality Transition, 1970–85
Other Asian Countries
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but its secondary enrollments showed little appreciable gain. India recorded
progress in both the fertility and enrollment dimensions, and Sri Lanka evolved
much as did its counterparts in East and Southeast Asia.
In what follows, we explore both the causes and the consequences of these
developments. It is appropriate to begin by considering families and their decisionmaking, recognizing that families are set in environments whose parameters
are established by markets and governments. The macroeconomic and policy
climates are exogenous to families, but, as noted above, aggregated family-level
decisions can shift the exogenous parameters.
Consider a newly married couple embarking on a reproductive career. Over
the course of that career, the couple will make decisions about the number of
children to bear and the education to be invested in each child. The time horizon
6

for reproduction is limited by the reproductive span of the woman, but educational decisions will continue to be made after reproduction has ceased. At each
age t, where we index age according to the age of the mother, the parents will
consult an information set I t that summarizes their knowledge of the
macroeconomy and, in particular, their perceptions and expectations of the economic returns to schooling. These rates of return affect parental decisions through
the anticipation of transfers from grown children as well as through altruistic
concern for the children’s wellbeing. The information set also contains accumulated family-specific information on the educational abilities of the children, which
may be combined with the aggregate returns to form child-specific forecasts.
At age t, having had nt children and having equipped them with amounts
(eit, i = 1,...,nt) by way of education, the parents will decide whether to have
another child (provided the woman is still capable of doing so) and whether to
further the education of all, none, or a selected few of these children. Policy
constraints may come into play with respect to education, such as when one child
has scored too poorly on a primary-school leaving exam to proceed to academic
secondary training.
This paper is not the place to discuss a fully dynamic model incorporating
such features, but several points deserve emphasis.3 First, parents desiring to
deepen human capital investments in children are unlikely to be able to finance
the investments by borrowing against future income. They can restrict fertility in
order to invest, but an alternative is to finance the investments from reductions in
own consumption. Another alternative is to reduce both fertility and consumption. The school costs can also be met by transfers from grown children or the wider
family. Our point is that although fertility reduction is a plausible outcome of the
desire to capture the returns to education, it is not the only possible outcome.
The required degree of reduction will depend, in part, on the direct costs of
schooling. These costs are sometimes dismissed as trivial, but can be important
in low-income, rural settings when considered in relation to the scarcity of cash.
7

In addition to the direct costs of schooling, parents may confront time costs in
childrearing that are linked to schooling. Parents who themselves have had little
or no schooling may not depart much from traditional modes of child care, but
second-generation parents—those who have been further in school—may see a
need to prepare their own children quite differently. We suspect that associated
with the quantity-quality transition is a fundamental change in the nature of child
care (LeVine et al. 1991), which may have reinforcing effects over the generations.
In the early stages of a quantity-quality transition, inequalities in investments among children are to be expected (Parish and Willis 1993), whether the
result of ability-based differences in the returns to schooling or of sex preferences on the part of parents (Behrman 1988). Where such inequalities are tolerated, parents may feel little compulsion to divide educational resources equally
among their children. A strategy of differential investment may let some parents
escape the need to severely restrict fertility (or consumption) in order to finance
schooling.
This discussion has presumed that the economic returns to schooling are
known to parents, but the sources of such knowledge deserve comment. It is far
from obvious that parental perceptions about returns are firmly grounded in empirical realities. More likely, knowledge of returns is based on impressions gleaned
from social networks, peers, and the media. Very little research has considered
the sources of these perceptions and their linkage, or the lack of it, to the macroeconomic data.4
F ERTILITY AND S CHOOLING: T HE M ACRO R ECORD
Armed with this micro-level perspective, we now briefly reexamine the
Asian record on fertility and schooling. Here and later in the paper, we contrast
the experiences of the rapidly growing economies of East and Southeast Asia
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with those of the slower-growing economies of South and South-Central Asia.
As will become evident, these subregions present some sharp contrasts, but surprising similarities can also be found. The lessons that can be derived from the
successful experiences of East and Southeast Asian countries cannot be thoroughly understood without reference to the wider regional context.
Figure 2 traces the record of fertility decline in Asia, with Figure 2a depicting the country-by-country data series in East and Southeast Asia, and Figure 2b
doing so for the other Asian countries. In the East Asian context, the Philippines,
Malaysia, and Indonesia now form a comparatively high-fertility group, with
total fertility rates above 2.5. The remaining countries of the subregion have
reached or fallen below replacement-level fertility, with the declines for Korea,
Figure 2a Total Fertility Rates in East and Southeast Asia, 1950–95
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Figure 2b Total Fertility Rates in Other Asian Countries, 1950–95
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Thailand, and China preceded by declines of similar magnitude in Singapore and
Hong Kong. As can be seen, Japanese fertility rates have long been near replacement. The other Asian countries (Figure 2b) have exhibited slower, shallower, or
more delayed fertility declines, with the fertility fall in Bangladesh being a notable
development of the 1980s. However, the differentials that once separated South
from Southeast Asia are no longer so clearly evident. Indian fertility levels have
come to match those of Indonesia, and Sri Lanka more closely resembles its East
than its South Asian counterparts.
Accompanying fertility decline in the region has been an expansion of enrollments at all levels.5 In East and Southeast Asia (data not shown), gross primary enrollment ratios were very high throughout the period under consideration
(1970–90), but elsewhere in Asia (see Figure 3), countries such as Sri Lanka,
10

Figure 3 Primary Gross Enrollment Ratios, Other Asian Countries, 1970–90
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Nepal, and Bangladesh recorded significant gains at the primary level. Pakistan
is all the more notable for its lack of progress.
At the secondary level (Figure 4), several East Asian countries have made
rapid advances, with Korea being the clearest example. Apart from Thailand,
whose gains at the secondary level were modest at best, steady improvement was
the regional norm. In South and South-Central Asia, by contrast, progress was
slower, with Sri Lanka again being the exception and surprising gains apparent in
Nepal in spite of its poverty. Indeed, by the end of the period, Nepal had reached
rough parity with Thailand in secondary enrollments.
Perhaps the single most important difference between the experiences of
the East and Southeast Asian countries and those of the other Asian countries is
the earlier achievement of near-universal primary schooling in the former group.
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Figure 4a Secondary Gross Enrollment Ratios, 1970–90
East and Southeast Asian Countries
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With the exception of Pakistan, the other Asian countries have made rapid progress in
primary enrollments (Figure 3), but the initial advantages of the Asian “tigers” may
have made the decisive difference to their rates of economic development.
According to Mingat (1998) and Mundle (1998), these successful countries realized and acted early on the need to expand primary and lower secondary
education. Government subsidies clearly favored these levels of the educational
system, and the private sector’s involvement in education was encouraged (for
the most part in tertiary schooling, although, in Indonesia, in primary as well).
Moreover, highly selective promotion and admission policies (such as practiced
in Latin America and Africa) were abolished, and the successful East Asian countries moved toward a system of automatic grade progression at the primary and
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Figure 4b Secondary Gross Enrollment Ratios, 1970–90
Other Asian Countries
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lower secondary levels.6 They also rapidly increased the number of schools in
rural areas.
R ETURNS TO S CHOOLING
In this section, we review empirical evidence on economic rates of return
to schooling in Asia and then explore, with the aid of cross-national data, several
hypotheses about the macroeconomic factors that can affect these returns. Rates
of return are the fundamental building blocks of human capital theory (Willis
1986). They play the dominant role in determining demands for schooling, and
thus have the potential to affect decisions about fertility as well. These returns
are not fixed or exogenous quantities; rather, they are akin to prices and would
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thus be expected to vary with supply and demand conditions, a country’s stage of
development, and its exposure to world market forces (Stokey 1996). We emphasized at the outset the possibility of negative feedbacks, by which growth in the
supply of educated labor could bring about a decline in rates of return. We must
also consider positive feedbacks and external influences.
For developed countries, numerous studies have documented the rates of
return to schooling and explored their determinants, most often through crosssectional studies but also, on occasion, using time series of cross-sections to examine temporal change. The possibilities for exploring time trends are more limited in developing countries, where differences in data collection and methodology
make intertemporal comparisons difficult.
One important source of data for developing countries has yet to be fully
exploited. In a series of publications, Psacharopoulos has assembled estimates of
internal rates of return to schooling, the most recent of these being Psacharopoulos
(1985, 1994). The data sources vary, but in most cases these estimates are based
on earnings regressions from cross-sectional labor force surveys. The estimates
compiled by Psacharopoulos include some from his own research, but most of
the results are derived from studies by others. In screening such studies,
Psacharopoulos has consistently excluded regressions with inappropriate controls (e.g., those including occupational dummies or other endogenous variables)
and studies that assign forgone earnings to young children.
The estimates that meet these criteria can be criticized on other grounds.
The internal rate-of-return method favored by Psacharopoulos requires assumptions about the number of years needed to progress from one level of schooling to
the next. In many countries, time to completion of a given educational level is
greatly affected by grade repetition, dropout, and reentry. With data lacking, applications of the method have also had to assume that the direct costs of schooling can be ignored.7 Despite the impressive effort to assure consistency, the labor
force data and regressions vary in many aspects, including the nature of sam14

pling, the inclusion or exclusion of women and those who do not work for wages,
the treatment of unemployment, use of questionable explanatory variables, adjustments for urban–rural cost of living differentials, and so on. Furthermore, the
reliance on cross-sectional data need not accord with the concept of expected
returns over the longer run and does not permit cohort-specific technical change
to be disentangled from other factors. Finally, labor force surveys do not allow
either the quality of schooling or individual ability to be taken into account.
Nevertheless, few alternatives to the Psacharopoulos estimates present themselves. Some Asian countries are now in a position to supply repeated crosssectional labor force surveys (e.g., Korea and Taiwan), and as the number of
these countries expands, this will provide a firmer foundation for the study of
trends and differentials in rates of return. But for the moment, there are too few
countries with such data to allow macroeconomic factors to be investigated. Although we recognize the limits of the Psacharopolous estimates, for our purposes
these data will suffice.
The empirical record
Figures 5–7 provide the full set of Psacharopoulos estimates of returns to
primary, secondary, and tertiary schooling for Asia. Where estimates are available for two or more points in time for a given country, we have linked the country observations with dotted lines to aid in the detection of trends. Few estimates
are available for the rate of return to primary schooling, but there are a number of
estimates to inspect at the secondary and tertiary levels.
These figures exhibit three main features. The first, and perhaps most important, is that the rate of return to schooling is quite high in absolute terms,
almost irrespective of the level of schooling considered. The second noteworthy
feature is the considerable variation in returns by country and time period. Interestingly, the East and Southeast Asian countries display neither consistently higher
nor consistently lower rates of return. (Single-year estimates for Hong Kong and
15

Figure 5 Private Rate of Return to Primary Schooling, 1965–89
All Asian Countries
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Singapore are high, as are the single-year estimates for Malaysia.) Third, time
trends in the returns to schooling in Asia are difficult to discern. In the case of
primary schooling (Figure 5), the few observations available permit no conclusion. At the secondary level (Figure 6), the picture is not much clearer. India exhibits
little change in the rate of return; Korea presents evidence of a slight decline; estimates for Taiwan suggest (rather implausibly) a sharp drop in a two-year period around
1970; Indonesian returns rise and then fall from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s; and
similar behavior is evident for the Philippines. Estimates at the tertiary level (Figure
7) are also mixed and inconclusive in regard to trend.
For two countries with richer data series, Korea and Taiwan, additional
evidence is available on wage ratios by level of education. (Wage ratios are not
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Figure 6 Private Rate of Return to Secondary Schooling, 1965–89
All Asian Countries
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the same as internal rates of return, but one would expect similar trends in these
alternative measures.) In the Korean case (Kim and Topel 1995), wages for university graduates rose relative to those for high school graduates until the mid1970s and then fell through the late 1980s. This pattern is also seen in studies of
Korea by Davis (1992) and Park et al. (1996). In the case of Taiwan, Gindling et al.
(1995) summarize the situation as one of relative stability from 1982 to 1991 in the
returns to schooling. Yet, by the 1987–94 period, evidence was emerging of declining
wage ratios (among those with junior college education and above relative to those
with lower schooling) due to supply shifts, although the decline was masked by demand-side factors that had an opposite influence (Huang, 1997, 1998).8
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Figure 7 Private Rate of Return to Tertiary Schooling, 1965–89
All Asian Countries
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One reading of the Asian record, then, is that with the exception of Korea
and, more recently, Taiwan, high economic returns to schooling have persisted. If
these returns have been affected by macroeconomic forces, they have not been so
strongly affected as to produce uniform or easily identifiable trends. One could
even say, looking at the broadest features of the empirical record, that the returns
to schooling have been remarkably stable, with the inevitable year-to-year and
country-to-country variation dominated by the high mean level of returns. If stability in this sense is the correct characterization, then it is a striking feature of
the Asian experience. Surely, in all Asian labor markets, the economic returns to
schooling must reflect supply and demand (Fields 1994; Mazumdar 1993;
Funkhouser 1998). How can the returns have remained largely unaffected?
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Shifts in supply and demand
On the supply side, there can be little doubt as to the magnitude of increase
in better-educated Asian labor. The Barro–Lee estimates of the education of adults
(Barro and Lee 1996) show substantial increases in average adult years of schooling.9 Examining another measure of skills, Berman et al. (1998) investigate trends
in the proportion of non-production workers in manufacturing. Although in Indonesia the proportion remained about the same during the 1980s, it increased in
South Korea, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh.
To produce relative stability in returns to schooling, these supply shifts
must have been counterbalanced by shifts in the demand for educated, skilled
labor. Demand shifts are subtler and more difficult to detect than supply shifts,
and there is considerable controversy about which demand-side influences have
been dominant in Asia. We consider several leading hypotheses.
Capital accumulation. One possibility is that the accumulation of physical
capital in Asia has encouraged a disproportionate shift in the demand for bettereducated labor. If capital and skilled labor are strong complements, such accumulation would tend to sustain the returns to schooling. As is well known, some
Asian countries have compiled an impressive record of capital accumulation.
Data on the non-residential capital to worker ratios (Summers and Heston 1991,
data not shown here) reveal remarkable increases in Taiwan and Korea, although the
series for Hong Kong, Thailand, and the Philippines exhibit lesser improvements.
But increases in physical capital, however remarkable in some cases, need
not disproportionately stimulate the demand for skilled labor. On the key question of whether physical capital is complementary to skilled labor, there is little
Asian research to cite. Hamermesh (1986) summarized much of the literature in
an early and still influential review, which unfortunately included no developing
countries. Although there was more variation in the estimates than might have been
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supposed, the tentative conclusion from this review was that capital and skilled labor
are likely to be more complementary than are capital and unskilled labor.10
To our knowledge, no econometric research focusing on Asia has estimated
the elasticities of substitution between physical capital, skilled labor, and unskilled labor. But trends in the composition of manufacturing from 1973 to 1988
suggest a role for capital–skill complementarities (World Bank 1993). In East
Asian manufacturing, three subsectors are believed to have strong
complementarities between capital and skilled labor—metal products, electronics, and machinery. These subsectors grew rapidly during 1973–88 in terms of
their shares of total manufacturing value added. Taken together, their shares
doubled in Japan and Singapore, nearly tripled in Indonesia and Korea, and quadrupled in Malaysia. To the degree that this growth was fueled by capital investment and associated with shifts in the demand for skilled labor, these subsectors
may well have supported the returns to education. However, the textile and garment sectors, not usually viewed as having strong capital–skill complementarities,
continued to account for an important share of manufacturing value added.
To sum up, the evidence in favor of capital–skill complementarities for
Asia is weak and indirect. Nevertheless, in view of the region’s impressive record
of capital accumulation, this remains a persuasive hypothesis.
Technological change. An alternative explanation stresses the role of skillbiased technological change in sustaining the returns to schooling. This hypothesis has been advanced as the principal explanation for wage change in the United
States (Johnson 1997; Berman et al. 1998; Berman 1994; Lawrence and Slaughter 1993).
Much evidence suggests that technology and skilled labor are complementary. The now-classic hypothesis is that education allows workers to use new
technology more efficiently (Schultz 1975). Apart from studies of agriculture,
much of the data favoring this hypothesis has been drawn from developed coun-
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tries, principally the United States. Examining a panel of U. S. manufacturing
industries from 1960 to 1980, Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) find that the implementation of new technologies was associated with an increase in the share of
highly educated labor in total labor cost. Berndt et al. (1992) regress the nonproduction share of total employment on a capital-intensity measure and a measure of the share of high-technology capital in total capital. They find evidence of
general capital–skill complementarity and complementarity of high-tech capital
and skills. Other authors have emphasized the spread of computer technology
(Autor et al. 1997; Berman et al. 1994), which may also be associated with skill
upgrading and greater returns to skills.11
How relevant are such findings to Asia? In a study of educational wage
differentials in Korea, Choi (1993) finds that workers in 1982 were paid more in
industries undergoing rapid technological change, with technological change being
measured by total factor productivity (TFP) growth rates from 1962 to 1976. The
spread of technology evidently benefited all workers in these industries. For men,
the regression coefficient on the interaction between the TFP growth rate and
schooling suggests that faster technological change raised the returns to education (particularly relative to low levels of schooling). Yet, somewhat contrary to
expectations, Choi finds that for women the interaction between the TFP growth
rate and high school education had a greater effect on wages than did the interaction with college education.
Choi also examines the effects of research and development (R&D) spending within industries, focusing on R&D from 1982 to 1988 as a determinant of
wages in 1988. Increases in R&D intensity in an industry (intensity being the
ratio of R&D expenditures to sales) were associated with higher wages for both
men and women in that industry, but only for women did greater intensity bring
about an increase in the educational wage differential at the secondary and tertiary levels. The interaction between R&D intensity and college schooling was
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positive and significant for women, suggesting that although increases in intensity raised all women’s wages, female college graduates benefited to a greater
extent. Results such as these suggest a complex web of relationships linking technological change, returns to schooling, and gender.
Distinguishing technological change from capital accumulation. As Rodrik
(1997) points out, fundamental identification problems confront any effort to
partition growth rates into accumulation-related factors and technological change.
Technological change is difficult to measure by any direct means. Its presence is
usually inferred from the residuals in growth or wage share regressions, whose
form is derived from more fundamental assumptions about production functions.
The interpretation of residuals in terms of technological change rests, therefore, on
arguable assumptions about the proper specification of the production function.
This leaves the terms of the debate unresolved. For the United States, Krusell
et al. (1997) claim that they can explain much of the rise in wage differentials as
the result of capital accumulation. Berman et al. (1998) insist that the differential
is the result of pervasive skill-biased technological change. For Asia, Young (1995)
argues that much of the East Asian productivity growth from 1960 to 1990 can be
better explained by factor accumulation than by technological change. Kim and
Lau (1994) also find that capital accumulation was the most important source of
East Asian economic growth from the late 1950s until 1990. They see little evidence that the East Asian economies experienced appreciable technological
progress during the postwar period, apart from the special case of Hong Kong.
Yet Sarel (1997), examining many of the same countries, finds rapid rates of
technological progress. In this debate, there is much contention over the details
of modeling and the precise conceptualization of technological change.12
How might trade affect returns?
Did the outward trade orientation of the East and Southeast Asian economies affect their returns to schooling? Observers of East Asia’s economic growth
22

have often emphasized the region’s adoption of export-promoting development
policies. For example, Nancy Birdsall and Anne Krueger argue that export sectors
in developing countries tend to be more labor intensive than import competing sectors, suggesting that the promotion of exports will increase employment and encourage a more equal distribution of income.13 The link to educational differentials
in earnings, however, has been left unclear.
The theory on this question is inconclusive, because competing models of
trade give different answers about how trade liberalization should affect wage
differentials. According to the standard Heckscher–Ohlin and Stolper–Samuelson
theories, when a labor-abundant country opens trade with a capital-abundant country, wages will rise and returns to capital will fall in the labor-abundant country.
If East Asian countries are labor-abundant relative to the rest of the world, then,
with trade, wages should rise in these countries. Alternatively, one can abstract
from capital and other factors, and imagine that the two factors are skilled and
unskilled labor (Robbins 1996; Wood 1995; Lawrence 1993; Katz 1992), with
unskilled labor being the relatively abundant factor in Asia. In such cases, trade
liberalization will likely cause the wages of unskilled labor to rise relative to the
wages of skilled labor, and the returns to schooling should then fall.
Recent refinements of the Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson framework suggest additional implications. Davis (1996) and Leamer (1998) argue that what
matters is not global but rather local factor intensity. For example, Taiwan may
have an abundance of unskilled labor in relation to the world, but when compared to the Philippines or Thailand, Taiwan may be relatively abundant in skilled
labor. Therefore, when Taiwan opens trade with its neighbors, its returns to skilled
labor could rise. Leamer notes a further complication: a country’s comparative
advantage can shift as a result of physical capital accumulation and increased
educational levels of its workers. Through mechanisms such as these, the effects
of trade on wages could well change over time. Taiwan is often cited as a country
where this has occurred (Ranis 1996).
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Apart from effects attributable to comparative advantage and factor prices,
trade may also play an important indirect role by spurring capital accumulation.
A country’s success in exporting may encourage foreign direct investment on the
part of multinationals, because export orientation signals that the macroeconomy
is being well managed. If capital accumulation is faster as a result of foreign
direct investment, and if capital is complementary with schooling, the returns to
schooling could then rise. Stokey (1996) has traced the dynamic implications of
such links. Her simulation model incorporates three factors—capital, unskilled
labor, and skilled labor. Skilled labor and capital are taken to be complements. In
the context of this model, trade liberalization by a representative developing country encourages the inflow of capital from developed countries. The increase in
capital raises the returns to skilled labor over the medium run. Households, noting the increase in these returns, respond by increasing their investments in human capital. Over the long run, the ensuing supply shift then bids down the returns to skilled labor. The return to skill thus increases with the opening of trade
but subsequently decreases as educational levels rise.
The trade–technology link. We mentioned above the difficulty of separating technological change from capital accumulation; it is equally difficult to distinguish the direct role of trade from its role as a conduit for technological change. If
trade is associated with technology transfer, and if technology and skills are complementary, then this, too, could be a mechanism that supports the returns to schooling.
According to Pack and Page (1994), by exporting, countries can obtain
recent, “best practice” technology. For example, its substantial export earnings
have allowed Taiwan to import the latest equipment. Pack and Page estimate that
a considerable fraction of the residual in productivity growth could be attributed
to the technology embodied in imported equipment. In addition, exporting can
encourage direct technology transfer from developed-country buyers to their suppliers as the former strive to ensure quality control. Korea and Taiwan are be-
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lieved to have obtained technology in their footwear and clothing industries from
international buyers. As Keller (1997) notes, trade also allows countries to obtain
R&D cheaply through another route. The results of R&D are evident in blueprints, which can then be reverse-engineered. Whatever the mechanism, Nelson
and Pack (1998) stress that technology adoption is not a passive process, but
requires active engagement in learning-by-doing. Such learning is facilitated by
an educated labor force that is stocked with managers, engineers, and applied
scientists.
Although the means of technology transfer remain difficult to identify, a
growing empirical literature examines whether countries benefit from the R&D
investments made by their trading partners. Much of the evidence is drawn from
developed countries,14 but a few studies have examined developing countries.
Two of these find evidence that East Asian economies have benefited from the
R&D investments of their trading partners. Choi (1993) investigates the spillover
benefits for Korea of changing R&D intensity within OECD countries. The OECD
R&D intensities have a positive effect on Korean workers’ wages, although only
for Korean women does the educational wage differential increase. Indeed, for
men this mechanism seems to compress wage differentials.
Further evidence, albeit indirect, is provided by Evenson and Singh (1997),
who examine 11 Asian countries over the period 1970–93. They find that the
beneficial effects of international investments in R&D were greater in Southeast
Asian countries than in South Asian countries. (Evenson and Singh focus not on
earnings differentials as such, but rather on productivity effects as measured in
gross domestic product.) In their regressions, countries that had a higher share of
imports relative to GDP benefited more from foreign R&D than did countries
with low levels of imports. Evenson and Singh argue that a developing country
needs a minimum level of human capital in order to take advantage of foreign
R&D. At least for the high-performing Asian countries in their sample, a positive
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productivity gain resulted from the interaction of foreign R&D and domestic
secondary school enrollments.
Only a few researchers have attempted to directly connect changes in relative wages in developing countries to changes in their trade policies. Robbins
(1994), examining the effects of trade liberalization in Chile, finds that relative
wages of university graduates compared to primary school graduates increased
during the 1980s, and that relative demand shifts favored skilled workers over
unskilled workers. He cannot, however, tie these shifts in demand to trade policy
changes. In another paper, Robbins (1996) uncovers similar effects of trade liberalization in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Uruguay, attributable mainly to the expansion of sectors that intensively use skilled labor.15 Although the connection
remains plausible, the literature has yet to establish a convincing link between
changes in trade policy and changes in wage differentials.
Cross-country evidence
To summarize this wide-ranging discussion, we present in Table 1 a set of
descriptive, cross-country regression models in which the dependent variables
are the rates of return to schooling at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels.
The regression models are estimated separately by level of education. There are
very few observations on primary rates of return, and these findings can only be
taken as suggestive.
The explanatory factors entering these models include the value of nonresidential capital per worker,16 the ratio of adults over 25 years of age with the
specified level of education to those with the next lower level of educational
attainment,17 a measure of openness to trade,18 regional dummy variables, and
dummy variables for time period. The specification we employ is loosely modeled on the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function specifications often used in the labor literature (for instance Freeman 1979).
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We would expect the capital per worker variable to have a positive influence on returns to both secondary and tertiary education. The adult educational
ratios should have a negative effect, because these are measures of the relative
supply of skills in the labor market. According to the discussion above, openness
to trade should be associated with the transfer of skill-intensive technology, among
other things, and might have a positive effect on the returns to schooling at the
secondary or tertiary levels.
In Table 1, we first present the results of a model containing only the regional dummy variables and time period dummies. The omitted regional category is “developed countries,” although Japan is classified under East and Southeast Asia. Two features of the benchmark regressions are noteworthy. First, there
is little here to suggest that returns to schooling are much different in East and
Southeast Asia than in developed countries, whereas rates of return in Africa and
Latin America (at least at the secondary and tertiary levels) are clearly higher.
Second, only weak evidence emerges of time trends in returns at the primary or
tertiary levels, although evidence of downward trends is somewhat stronger at
the secondary level.
In the second column of the table, we include measures of non-residential
capital per worker and the ratio of adults by educational level. The third column adds
a trade openness measure, defined as the ratio of imports plus exports to gross domestic product. Contrary to expectations, neither capital per worker nor the adult educational ratio makes much of a difference. Capital per worker is negatively associated
with educational returns at all levels of schooling, although significant only at the
tertiary level. More consistent with theory is the negative sign of the educational ratio
coefficients for primary and tertiary returns—as would be expected from shifts in the
relative supplies of labor—but these estimates are also insignificant. The lack of significance is surprising given the Korean results (Kim and Topel 1995) and similar
findings from other countries with cross-section, time-series data.19
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Table 1 Rate of Return Regressions: Full Method Estimates from Psacharopoulos
(1985, 1994)
Returns to Completed Primary
Constant
( |z|-statistic)
Africa
Latin America
East and Southeast Asia
Other Asia

19.920
(1.69)
23.136
(1.98)
9.035
(0.81)
7.713
(0.64)
.430
(0.03)

Ratio of completed primary
to none or incomplete
Non-residential capital
per worker (000’s)
Trade openness
1970–1979
1980 and later
R2
Number of observations

–2.233
(0.23)
–3.700
(0.43)
.124
54

24.686
(1.43)
16.483
(0.84)
3.287
(0.20)
4.356
(0.29)
1.290
(0.06)
–1.623
(0.13)
–.434
(0.50)

.092
33

1.113
(0.05)
–1.209
(0.06)
–3.911
(0.21)
–7.141
(0.44)
9.741
(0.44)
–6.341
(0.53)
–.311
(0.37)
.364
(2.11)
22.227
(1.11)
11.265
(0.52)
.273
33

Returns to Completed Secondary
Constant
( |z|-statistic)
Africa
Latin America
East and Southeast Asia
Other Asia

15.192
(7.26)
14.622
(5.26)
5.126
(2.19)
4.206
(1.57)
3.677
(1.07)

Ratio of completed secondary
to primary or incomplete
Non-residential capital
per worker (000’s)
Trade openness
1970–1979
1980 and later
R2
Number of observations

–5.013
(2.12)
–4.769
(1.91)
.247
109

12.206
(3.96)
25.848
(5.85)
2.387
(0.82)
–.426
(0.13)
3.904
(0.93)
2.390
(0.39)
–.052
(0.36)

.453
71

12.232
(3.46)
28.113
(5.68)
5.334
(1.51)
.092
(0.03)
5.130
(1.22)
6.483
(1.03)
–.034
(0.25)
.063
(1.81)
–5.007
(1.72)
–7.781
(2.16)
.510
71

Table 1 (continued)
Returns to Tertiary
Constant
( |z|-statistic)
Africa

13.506
(8.43)
17.406
(7.28)
8.514
(4.23)
3.992
(1.92)
6.079
(1.97)

Latin America
East and Southeast Asia
Other Asia
Ratio of tertiary
to secondary
Non-residential capital
per worker (000’s)
Trade openness
1970–1979

–2.426
(1.29)
–4.197
(2.05)
.353
115

1980 and later
R2
Number of observations

19.960
(6.07)
11.710
(2.92)
4.848
(1.87)
–1.491
(0.60)
–.332
(0.08)
–3.759
(1.53)
–.255
(2.24)

.331
77

17.046
(4.42)
11.726
(2.54)
6.164
(1.84)
–1.422
(0.52)
.806
(0.19)
–2.740
(1.00)
–.231
(1.89)
.046
(1.32)
.428
(0.16)
–1.838
(0.55)
.353
77

Omitted region: developed. No observations from Middle East or from developing-country Oceania.
Japan in East and Southeast Asia.

In the full specification presented in column 3, only the trade openness
measure is positively associated with returns to schooling. It is a (weakly) significant influence on both primary and secondary returns, although insignificant in
the tertiary returns regression. Finally, the time period dummy variables, which in
the full specification of column 3 can be viewed as proxies for skill-related technological progress, are significant only in the secondary schooling regression. As
in the benchmark regression of column 1, in the full model they suggest a downward trend in the returns to secondary schooling.20
These results provide weak support for the proposition that trade affects the
returns to schooling, to judge from the coefficients in the primary and secondary
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returns regressions. Perhaps the coefficients reveal the aspect of trade associated
with comparative advantage and tendencies toward factor price equalization. Had
trade been an important conduit for new technology, then one would have expected the openness to trade measures to be more clearly associated with the
returns to tertiary schooling. However, the industry-level findings of Choi (1993)
for Korea seem to suggest that technological progress could have a greater effect
on returns to secondary schooling than on tertiary returns.
These cross-national regression estimates should be regarded cautiously,
because such data do not provide a firm foundation for understanding the
complementarity of capital and skills or the precise roles of trade and technology.
No doubt country fixed effects are important in determining the returns to schooling, as are specific aspects of labor market policies and schooling policies that
affect, respectively, wage levels and degrees of access to secondary and higher
levels of schooling. Even in the absence of country-level panel data, however,
one would have anticipated clearer evidence in the cross-country record of the
influence of skills accumulation, growth of capital per worker, and technological
change, which must be among the fundamental forces shaping the returns to
schooling.
Q UANTITY AND Q UALITY AT THE F AMILY L EVEL
From an Asian family’s perspective, the workings of the macroeconomy
are doubtless hidden from view or are only dimly perceived. As we argued at the
outset, little is known about how families themselves gauge the returns to schooling, and it is possible that local rather than national labor markets exert a disproportionate influence on their thinking. Even if the national labor markets are
salient, family perceptions of returns could significantly differ from, or lag well
behind, the national-level empirical realities. Socially pertinent information about
economic change would tend to filter slowly through a family’s networks of peers
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and relatives, and although the media would transmit information more rapidly,
it is not clear that their inevitable focus on novelty and crisis would supply families with information bearing on longer-run concerns.
Given the limited and fragmentary information that families possess, it is
sensible to conceive of their schooling and fertility decisions as being based only
on the broadest features of the returns to schooling. The dominant empirical regularity identified in the previous section is that returns to schooling are high—
even very high—in absolute terms. Perhaps it is sufficient that Asian families
appreciate this central fact; perhaps, in most circumstances, variations in returns
about the high mean are of second-order importance.
If they take the high returns to schooling as a given, families are then likely
to be more concerned with the direct costs of schooling, the time costs entailed in
properly preparing their children for schooling, and the examination-based and
other policy barriers that might prevent them from securing access to these high
returns. In following this line of thinking, we are led to consider evidence of
quantity-quality tradeoffs at the level of family decisionmaking.
In this section, we explore a range of micro-level data sets that contain
information on fertility and child-by-child schooling investments. We examine
data from Pakistan (1991), Bangladesh (1993), Indonesia (1993), Malaysia (1988),
the Philippines (1993), Thailand (1987), and Taiwan (1989). The aim is to estimate reduced-form models of fertility and children’s schooling that may elucidate the factors that can produce a quantity-quality tradeoff. We adopt specifications that, although not identical across countries, are sufficiently similar to permit
comparison of effects.
The data sets form a diverse group. For Pakistan, we employ the 1991
Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS), a nationally representative data
set containing substantial information on both fertility and children’s schooling.
For Bangladesh, we use data from a rural population that has been under demo-
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graphic surveillance since 1982 by the Extension Project (EP), a study similar in
design to the better-known Matlab project. The data for Indonesia and Malaysia
are drawn from the Family Life Surveys (FLS) conducted by RAND and its country
collaborators. Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) data are available for the
Philippines and Thailand; and for Taiwan, we use the Taiwan Women and Family
Survey (TWFS) described in Parish and Willis (1993).
To the degree possible, we have assembled data on the fertility of the respondent (the woman) in each household and on the education of all of her own
children. Our fertility measure is children ever born, which is available in all the
data sources we use. A key concern across the surveys, however, is the measurement of children’s education. Typically, less is known about the education of
children who no longer reside in the household than about the schooling of those
who are still resident. For example, current school attendance is not usually ascertained for non-resident children, and often the levels of schooling attained are
summarized in broader groupings than for resident children.
In our data sets, the designs of the Pakistan LSMS, the Malaysian and
Indonesian FLS, the Thailand DHS, and the Taiwan TWFS all permit useful information on schooling to be retrieved for non-resident children. The Philippines
DHS data on schooling are limited to resident children, as are the Bangladesh Extension Project data. Elsewhere we have studied the likely selection bias for the Philippines (Montgomery et al. 1998b) and have concluded that if only children aged
18 and younger are considered, the biases are likely to be small. In the case of
Bangladesh, levels of schooling are low enough that serious bias is also unlikely.
Specification
In modeling fertility and children’s school attainment, we use ordered-probit
models for each. This is a sufficiently flexible approach to capture the main features of lifetime fertility and educational attainment. Since many of the women

32

interviewed are in the midst of their reproductive careers, and likewise many of
the children have not completed their schooling, we must employ controls for the
woman’s age and her children’s ages.
To understand the specification from the perspective of the quantity-quality tradeoff, recall that models being estimated are reduced-form in nature. A
tradeoff is therefore evident if a given exogenous variable has the effect of reducing fertility and raising children’s educational attainment. This sign pattern does
not in itself reveal the mechanism by which the tradeoff emerges, but rather signals the existence of such a tradeoff.
In our discussion, we focus on a small set of such explanatory covariates.
The woman’s own educational attainment enters each model, as does the education of her spouse if she is married (otherwise the spouse’s variables are set to
zero). Urban residence is included, although this is current residence. A collection of indicators of the household’s economic status is also included. These heterogeneous measures range from indices of household possessions (Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand) to indicators of the occupation
of the spouse (Taiwan). As discussed elsewhere (Montgomery et al. 1997b), such
indices are likely to be weak but still useful proxies for the preferred measures of
permanent (or longer-term) income.
For three countries—Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia—we can introduce
time-specific controls for the presence of schools in the community. We use the
dates on which the schools were established to construct measures of access to
schools as of the year in which the woman in question reached age 17. The idea
is to characterize this aspect of the decision environment as it existed around the
time of her marriage.
Given the data available, identification of trends is difficult. We include
measures of the birth cohort of the mother, recognizing that such measures must
be associated with the mother’s age and thus with the degree to which her fertil-
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ity career is complete (and, less directly, with the completeness of her children’s
education). For Taiwan, we have access to information on fertility and education
in the previous generation, as measured by the number of the respondent’s siblings and their education. As did Parish and Willis (1993), we use these data to
shed light on earlier regimes of fertility and educational decisionmaking.
Results
We do not dwell on country-by-country details of the estimates, but rather
describe the common features of the results. The models themselves are presented in Tables 2 through 9.
Woman’s education. A striking result is that better-educated women have
lower lifetime fertility and equip their children with greater education. This finding is consistent across countries and data sets, with the curious exception of
Indonesia, where fertility is not significantly reduced except by senior secondary
or higher schooling. The effects of the woman’s education on her fertility range
from modest to powerful (results not shown) and the effects on the level or years
of children’s education are also substantively important. As we seek to understand the quantity-quality tradeoff at the family level, therefore, this variable
merits prime consideration.
Spouse’s schooling. The schooling of the spouse tends to reduce fertility, although it is generally of less importance than the woman’s schooling. Taiwan and the
Philippines present exceptions to the rule, with the spouse’s schooling having a positive influence on fertility. This may be evidence of an income effect not captured by
other controls. Where children’s education is concerned, the spouse’s schooling usually exerts a significant positive influence, although the magnitude of the effect tends
to be smaller than for the woman’s schooling.21 In summary, increases in the schooling of men tend to induce a quantity-quality tradeoff.
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Table 2

Children Ever Born and Level of Schooling: Pakistan LSMS, 1991
Children Ever Born
N=3,296

Child’s Sex
Girl
( |z|-statistic)
Woman’s Schooling
Primary

Children’s Level
of Schooling
N=9,177
–.589
(24.25)

Middle school or more
Spouse’s Schooling
Primary
Middle school
Secondary or more
Household Possessions
Index
Index, squared
Residence
Urban
Woman’s Cohort
Born before 1950
Born 1950–1955

–.302
(4.54)
–.656
(9.66)

.421
(9.58)
.493
(10.57)

–.024
(0.49)
–.079
(1.61)
–.300
(4.03)

.219
(6.65)
.584
(18.49)
.803
(15.97)

.104
(2.11)
–.012
(1.55)

.217
(2.69)
–.010
(0.08)

.117
(1.80)

.527
(11.01)

.667
(5.05)
.322
(3.77)

.010
(0.16)
–.014
(0.30)

Children’s education levels: none, primary, middle, secondary, college and higher.
Coefficients not shown: mother’s age and powers of age, child’s age and powers of age, school availability, ordered-probit cut points.

Urban residence. In view of the easier access to family planning services
and schools in urban areas, and the profound changes underway in the distribution of population between rural and urban areas, the role of urban residence in
promoting a tradeoff is of considerable interest. Our results indicate that urban
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Table 3 Children Ever Born and Years of Schooling: Bangladesh Extension
Project, 1993
Children Ever Born
N=9,782
Child’s Sex
Girl
( |z|-statistic)
Woman’s Schooling
Incomplete primary

Children’s Years
of Schooling
N=19,779
–.225
(12.87)

Complete primary or more
Spouse’s Schooling
Incomplete primary
Complete primary or more
Household Possessions
Radio
Electricity
House size medium
House size large
Woman’s Cohort
Born before 1950
Born 1950–1955

–.058
(1.96)
–.191
(5.70)

.399
(17.12)
.594
(21.26)

.028
(0.98)
–.117
(3.91)

.213
(9.20)
.590
(25.52)

–.105
(4.41)
–.040
(1.28)
.031
(1.27)
.090
(2.53)

.186
(9.87)
.272
(11.76)
.243
(12.17)
.417
(15.56)

.200
(2.23)
.198
(3.72)

.117
(2.58)
.029
(0.92)

Coefficients not shown: mother’s age and powers of age, child’s age and powers of age,
regional dummies, ordered-probit cut points.

residence is usually an important positive influence on children’s educational
attainment (the Philippines is an exception) and, depending on country, generally
exerts a modest negative influence on fertility.
Economic status. Because the data sets are heterogenous in measures of
economic status, we cannot draw detailed conclusions from these coefficients.
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Table 4 Children Ever Born and Level of Schooling: Indonesian Family Life
Survey, 1993
Children Ever Born
N=3,578
Child’s Sex
Girl
( |z|-statistic)
Woman’s Schooling
Primary

Children’s Level
of Schooling
N=8,602
–.075
(2.90)

Junior Secondary
Senior Secondary or higher
Spouse’s Schooling
Primary
Junior Secondary
Senior Secondary or higher
Residence
Urban
Woman’s Cohort
Born before 1950
Born 1950–1955

.215
(0.99)
–.013
(0.04)
–.647
(2.03)

.562
(7.07)
1.148
(8.58)
1.425
(7.16)

–.308
(1.39)
–.339
(1.14)
–.101
(0.31)

.101
(1.34)
.134
(0.99)
.019
(0.10)

–.044
(1.20)

.349
(12.52)

.119
(0.72)
.004
(0.05)

–.035
(0.50)
–.104
(2.20)

Children’s education levels: none, primary, junior secondary, senior secondary, college and higher.
Coefficients not shown: mother’s age and powers of age, married, child’s age and powers of age,
religion, school availability, ordered-probit cut points.

The effects of economic status on fertility are variable, with positive influences
apparent in Pakistan and Malaysia but negative effects in the Philippines and
Thailand. In Taiwan, the clearest contrast is between households with spouses
who work in agriculture and all other households. With respect to children’s educational attainment, we see uniformly positive effects of higher status. If atten-
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Table 5 Children Ever Born and Level of Schooling: Malaysian Family Life
Survey, 1988
Children’s Level
of Schooling
N=4,222

Children Ever Born
N=858
Child’s Sex
Girl
( |z|-statistic)
Woman’s Schooling
Primary
Secondary or higher
Spouse’s Schooling
Primary
Secondary or higher
Household possessions
Index
Index, squared
Residence
Urban
Woman’s Cohort
Born before 1950
Born 1950–1955

–.204
(5.55)
–.294
(3.55)
–.637
(4.30)

.354
(8.42)
.470
(5.34)

.108
(1.09)
–.244
(1.72)

.098
(1.92)
.338
(4.18)

.200
(2.35)
–.014
(1.81)

.234
(4.89)
–.008
(1.83)

–.056
(0.64)

.119
(2.95)

–.346
(0.90)
–.294
(1.03)

–.041
(0.33)
–.088
(0.75)

Children’s education levels: none, any primary, any secondary, any tertiary.
Coefficients not shown: mother’s age and powers of age, married, child’s age and powers of age,
ethnicity, school availability, ordered-probit cut points.

tion were restricted to the Philippines and Thailand, improvements in these dimensions of economic status would evidently have the potential to induce a quantityquality tradeoff. In other settings (e.g., Pakistan), we can identify no such potential.
Cohort effects. The clearest evidence of cohort effects is seen in the Taiwan sibling analysis (Table 9), which identifies time trends—associated with the
birth cohort of the respondent’s mother—acting to reduce fertility and increase
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Table 6

Children Ever Born and Years of Schooling: Philippines DHS, 1993
Children Ever Born
N=15,029

Child’s Sex
Girl
( |z|-statistic)
Woman’s Schooling
Secondary

Children’s Years
of Schooling
N=14,290
.263
(15.11)

Higher
Spouse’s Schooling
Secondary
Higher
Household possessions
Index
Index, squared
Residence
Town
Small city
Manila
Woman’s Cohort
Born before 1950
Born 1950–1955

–.363
(14.08)
–.829
(25.11)

.273
(12.11)
.291
(9.10)

.198
(7.64)
.243
(7.47)

.216
(9.51)
.243
(7.88)

–.079
(4.17)
–.002
(0.83)

.292
(17.93)
–.014
(9.62)

–.009
(0.28)
–.041
(1.60)
–.190
(5.23)

.010
(0.37)
–.014
(0.63)
.009
(0.25)

.094
(1.02)
.083
(1.75)

.059
(1.12)
–.008
(0.26)

Coefficients not shown: mother’s age and powers of age, married, child’s age and powers of age,
ordered-probit cut points.

children’s educational investments. We also included a dummy variable distinguishing children born after 1956 from those born earlier, in order to see whether
the 1968 increase in the mandatory level of schooling had any effect. This variable did not prove to be significant (results not shown).

39

Table 7 Children Ever Born and Years of Schooling: Thailand DHS, 1987
Children Ever Born
N=6,760
Child’s Sex
Girl
( |z|-statistic)
Woman’s Schooling
Primary
Secondary
Higher
Spouse’s Schooling
Secondary
Higher
Household possessions
Index
Index, squared
Residence
Other urban
Bangkok
Woman’s Cohort
Born before 1950
Born 1950–1955

Children’s Years
of Schooling
N=8,196
–.012
(0.52)

–.270
(5.91)
–.515
(7.96)
–.981
(11.58)

.457
(12.06)
.680
(10.73)
.707
(7.72)

–.250
(6.60)
–.317
(4.78)

.310
(7.97)
.211
(2.86)

–.228
(7.59)
.019
(5.75)

.129
(4.55)
.002
(0.55)

–.173
(4.56)
–.239
(6.64)

.169
(4.50)
.271
(7.67)

.135
(1.23)
.008
(0.12)

.169
(2.45)
.065
(1.46)

Coefficients not shown: mother’s age and powers of age, married, child’s age and powers of age,
ordered-probit cut points.
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Table 8 Children Ever Born and Level of Schooling: Taiwan Women and Family
Survey 1989
Children Ever Born
N=3,803
Child’s Sex
Girl
( |z|-statistic)
Woman’s Schooling
Completed Primary
Some Secondary
Completed Secondary or Higher
Spouse’s Schooling
Completed Primary
Some Secondary
Completed Secondary or Higher
Own Home
Spouse’s Occupation
Prof./Tech./Teacher
Admin./Manager
Clerical
Sales
Service
Prod./Trans. Worker
Soldier, other
Residence
Urban
Woman’s Cohort
Born before 1950

Children’s Level
of Schooling
N=9,512
–.114
(4.77)

–.207
(3.88)
–.522
(7.23)
–.972
(13.21)

.274
(8.80)
.305
(5.88)
.088
(1.61)

.169
(2.67)
.079
(6.60)
–.091
(1.20)
.120
(3.17)

.311
(8.77)
.483
(10.14)
.677
(13.58)
.042
(1.54)

–.217
(2.35)
–.144
(1.63)
–.148
(1.79)
–.121
(1.65)
–.137
(1.48)
–.217
(3.50)
–.261
(3.00)

.084
(1.17)
.008
(0.12)
–.022
(0.35)
.078
(1.41)
–.162
(2.42)
–.117
(2.33)
–.241
(4.59)

–.159
(4.03)

.141
(5.20)

–.051
(0.68)

–.023
(0.42)

Children’s education levels: none, some primary, completed primary, some secondary, completed
secondary, university.
Omitted category for spouse’s occupation is agriculture.
Coefficients not shown: mother’s age and powers of age, married, child’s age and powers of age,
dummies for missing husband’s education and occupation, ordered-probit cut points.

Table 9 Number of Siblings and Their Level of Schooling: Taiwan Women and
Family Survey 1989
Children Ever Born
to Respondent’s Mother
N=3,796
Child’s Sex
Girl
( |z|-statistic)
Mother’s Schooling
Completed Primary
Any Secondary or Higher
Father’s Schooling
Completed Primary
Any Secondary or Higher
Father’s Occupation
Prof./Tech./Teacher
Admin./Manager
Clerical
Sales
Service
Prod./Trans. Worker
Soldier, other
Residence at Age 15
Urban
Subjective Adequacy of Income
Adequate
Well Off

Siblings’ and
Respondent’s Level
of Schooling
N=21,304
–.534
(34.37)

–.108
(2.17)
–.292
(3.35)

.374
(16.41)
.709
(16.43)

.052
(1.16)
.028
(0.40)

.531
(26.66)
.798
(25.20)

–.098
(0.93)
–.053
(0.60)
–.001
(0.02)
–.098
(1.68)
–.066
(0.71)
–.108
(2.09)
–.512
(4.90)

.551
(11.09)
.734
(17.84)
.551
(17.13)
.356
(13.59)
.252
(5.97)
.127
(5.50)
.848
(15.89)

–.163
(4.51)

.248
(15.14)

–.052
(1.33)
–.045
(0.60)

.271
(15.59)
.485
(14.14)

Table 9 (continued)
Children Ever Born
to Respondent’s Mother
N=3,796

Siblings’ and
Respondent’s Level
of Schooling
N=21,304

.063
(0.75)
–.031
(0.41)
–.091
(1.20)
–.379
(5.09)
–.533
(6.84)
–.756
(8.71)
–.840
(6.02)

.233
(6.35)
.455
(13.39)
.580
(17.26)
.713
(21.18)
.764
(21.51)
.770
(18.87)
.683
(9.93)

Mother’s Birth Cohort
Born 1910–14
Born 1915–19
Born 1920–24
Born 1925–29
Born 1930–34
Born 1935–39
Born 1940–44

Respondent’s and siblings’ education levels: none, completed primary, any secondary, any higher.
Omitted category for father’s occupation is agriculture; omitted category for birth cohort is mother
born before 1910.
Coefficients not shown: dummies for missing father’s education and occupation, missing mother’s
age and education, missing income adequacy, ordered-probit cut points.

Summary
Although the results above are drawn from a heterogeneous collection of
Asian countries, they display an impressive consistency. In drawing conclusions
from these results, we are intrigued by the central role played by women’s education. Much attention in the fertility literature has been given to the effect of
women’s education, but with a few important exceptions (Lillard and Willis 1994;
Behrman 1997; Schultz 1998; Lam and Duryea 1999) less consideration has been
given to its influence on the education of children.
Human capital theory can offer a general characterization of the relationship between the education of the mother and that of her children, but is less
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revealing on the specifics. Usually, the relationship is described as exemplifying
the greater efficiencies that are achieved by educated women in home production. This abstract description fails to illuminate the mechanisms.
One could view the connection as reflecting income effects in settings in
which better-educated women are much engaged in the labor market, and are
therefore better positioned to help meet the costs of schooling. Lam and Duryea
(1999) find little direct support for this proposition in Brazil. A related proposition is that better-educated women possess greater bargaining power in the household, and are able to secure a greater share of household resources for their children. Schultz (1998) and Behrman (1997) review the literature, and find a good
deal of evidence favoring this view.
Another possibility is that better-educated women are linked to social networks that contain more better-educated members. Through such network ties,
women may develop a keener appreciation of the economic benefits of schooling
and its non-economic benefits in health and related areas. The information available to educated women may reduce the variance of their perceptions and lessen
aversion to risk in making human capital investments. Such network-related information may well be expressed in the regression coefficient of mother’s education. Behrman (1997) outlines a similar argument in stressing the informational
advantages of educated women and their abilities to cope with change and economic disequilibrium.
An alternative explanation also merits consideration. Women who have
been to school themselves are likely, we think, to take a new view of the nature of
child care. They may come to believe that their own time must be devoted to such
care if their children are to be properly prepared for schooling and supported
during the school years. LeVine et al. (1991) report that educated women tend to
engage in a different form of interaction with their children, more often employing highly verbal and other time-intensive modes of communication. If this is so,
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then the changed nature of child care would raise the cost of numbers of children,
with attendant negative effects on fertility. Perhaps the new norms about proper
child care are transmitted to the younger generation of children, who act on them
when they enter their own childbearing years. Behrman (1997) suggests that better-educated mothers may provide more vivid “role models” for their children,
and research by Lillard and Willis (1994), among others, shows that such intergenerational mechanisms can be empirically important. In all this, the education
of the spouse has, it seems, a supportive influence, as does urban residence.
However plausible the proposition about child care may be, for the moment it must remain speculative. One might expect to find some confirmation of
the mother’s schooling effect in data on maternal time use. Yet, the comprehensive review by Behrman (1997) lists only two studies of mother’s schooling and
home time use. Both of these lend support to the hypothesis, but more research is
clearly required.
C ONCLUSION
The question posed at the outset was how the quantity-quality transition in
Asia could have continued as it did, given the negative feedback effects that are
inevitably associated with shifts in the supply of educated labor. Had other things
been held constant, these supply shifts should have reduced the returns to schooling and weakened the motivation for deeper investments in human capital and
for the fertility reductions that facilitate such investments. Although its working are
not always evident in the macroeconomic data, this theory appears unassailable.
But in Asia other things were not held constant, and the outcome was that
returns to schooling remained high, apart from some recent declines documented
for Taiwan and, earlier, for Korea. The macroeconomic forces sustaining these
returns include capital accumulation, technological change, and a set of effects
associated with trade. None of these influences is well understood, and the de-
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scriptive regressions that we presented could only suggest that the link to trade
deserves close attention.
The Asian transition was also propelled by powerful intergenerational forces
operating at the level of families. These positive feedbacks, by which the level of
schooling invested in one generation encourages deeper schooling investments
in the next, also remain poorly understood. They are linked, we believe, to evolving standards of child care that came to require a more intensive use of parental
time, and that may have raised the time costs of childrearing. Interestingly, these
effects are as clearly visible in the poorest South Asian countries of our sample
(Pakistan and Bangladesh) as they are in the richest of the Southeast Asian countries (Taiwan and Thailand). In this respect, at least, there is more commonality
among Asian countries than the literature’s preoccupation with Asian “tigers”
would suggest.
These days, the phrase “Asian tigers” is used ironically, and one wonders
whether the current macroeconomic and financial crisis will so shake Asian parents as to put in doubt the future of the quantity-quality transition. The opportunity cost of their children’s time in school has surely risen as the income of parents has fallen, and this may bring about a temporary lull in human capital
investment. Whether the crisis will permanently alter perceptions of the returns
to schooling is another matter. We predict that the returns will be perceived to be
diminished but still superior to what can be provided by alternative investments
or uses of time. Such predictions are hazardous, because little is known about the
nature and biases of perceptions of returns, the role of local labor conditions as
against national conditions, and other factors that affect parental views of schooling. This is among the high-priority areas for research.
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Notes
1

In this paper, we often refer to the concept of “rates of return” to schooling.
The concept stems from the idea that schooling is a form of investment,
involving both direct and indirect (opportunity) costs, and producing a
stream of returns into the future. The rate of return is the discount factor
that equates the present value of the stream of returns to the present value
of costs. It is analogous to a rate of interest and is commonly expressed in
percentage terms.

2

Lack of enrollment data for 1970 limits the Bangladesh case to the 1985
point shown in the graph.

3

Further discussion of the issues can be found in Montgomery and Lloyd
(1997) and Montgomery et al. (1998b).

4

See Manski (1992) and Dominitz and Manski (1994a, b) for an application
to U. S. labor markets and Montgomery (1998a) for a discussion of the
role of social learning in demographic dimensions.

5

We rely on enrollment data from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (1997), which are primarily based on UNESCO data.

6

See Birdsall and Sabot (1994) and Birdsall et al. (1995) for insightful comparisons of Latin American and East Asian schooling policies.

7

As the supply of educated labor increases, the costs of investing in schooling and other forms of human capital may decrease, at least to the extent
that costs are dominated by teacher and administrator salaries (Topel 1998).
Most studies of returns to schooling assume that the main costs to educa-
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tion are forgone earnings, and therefore miss the impact on returns due to
reduced costs on the supply side of schooling.
8

Supporting evidence is cited by Topel (1998), who refers to a dissertation
by H. C. Lu that found falling returns to human capital in Taiwan in response to increasing supplies of educated labor.

9

Data not shown. Without denying the magnitude of these increases,
Behrman and Schneider (1994b) caution that, when compared to other developing regions, advances in schooling in Asia from the mid-1960s to the
late 1980s were not clearly exceptional.

10

This conclusion has been incorporated in much subsequent work, such as
the model of Krusell et al. (1997), who specify a production function for
the United States with a much higher elasticity of substitution between
unskilled labor and capital equipment than between skilled labor and capital. Their model generates estimates that replicate closely the variation in
skilled–unskilled wage differentials from 1963 to 1991.

11

See DiNardo and Pischke (1997) for a skeptical view of the evidence.

12

Young (1995) and Krusell et al. (1997) have emphasized the importance of
refined measures of capital that allow capital equipment and structures to
be distinguished. Their substitutability with skilled labor differs, and some
evidence suggests that the price of capital equipment has declined relative
to the price of structures, thus preventing the two from being aggregated
into a composite measure of capital. In addition, the quality of capital equipment has improved, especially in computers. One wonders whether the
assumptions used to derive efficiency units of capital might, from the competing perspective, be viewed instead as representing technological change.
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13

See Birdsall and Sabot (1994), Birdsall et al. (1997), and Krueger (1990).

14

Using data from eight OECD countries, Keller (1997) finds evidence that
the benefit derived from foreign R&D in an industry is 50–95 percent of
the productivity effect of domestic R&D. Coe and Helpman (1993), in a
much-cited study of 22 developed-country economies, found that R&D
investment by trading partners had a large effect on total factor productivity. Perhaps the most interesting finding for present purposes is that foreign R&D capital stocks appear to have had particularly large effects on
the smaller countries in the Coe and Helpman sample. Also see Eaton and
Kortum (1994, 1995) for additional work in this vein.

15

Supporting evidence is provided by Feenstra and Hanson (1995) and
Feliciano (1995) for Mexico after its trade liberalization in the 1990s. Also
see Londono de la Cuesta (1990) and Davis (1992) for related Latin American studies. Milner and Wright (1998) concluded that wages and employment in Mauritius increased for skilled labor after trade liberalization.

16

The data are drawn from Summers and Heston (1991).

17

The data are drawn from Barro and Lee (1996).

18

Also taken from Summers and Heston (1991).

19

Recent papers by labor economists commenting on the growth literature
(Krueger and Lindahl 1998; Topel 1998) caution that the international data
on the educational levels of workers are prone to measurement error, a
potential weakness of the Barro–Lee data that we employ.

20

A number of additional specifications, whose results are not reported here,
have been explored. We have examined different specifications for adult
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educational attainment ratios and capital per worker; we have also investigated whether measures of school quality (Barro and Lee 1996) made an
appreciable difference. Although the alternative regressions differ from
those of Table 1 in the details, we uncovered no important substantive
differences.
21

See Behrman (1997) for an extensive review.
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